論文：分工網(wǎng)絡(luò)的動態(tài)學(xué)和穩(wěn)定性

論文：分工網(wǎng)絡(luò)的動態(tài)學(xué)和穩(wěn)定性

Abstract
This paper uses a cobweb model to investigate coordination failure of division of labour and economic crisis caused by the trade off between sensitive incentives and stability. There are two types of dynamic equations, one is for the number of specialists, and the other is for relative prices. This model can be used to e*plain fluctuations of e*cess demand for professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, with a time lag between education and professional work. Also, it can e*plain the economic crisis caused by liberalization reforms that increased sensitivity coefficients or trading efficiency by raising the mobility of capital, goods, and labour. (JEL: D58, E32)

Keywords: Cobweb model; coordination failure of division of labour; sensitive incentive.


摘要
這篇文章利用一個蛛網(wǎng)模型考察分工的協(xié)調(diào)失敗和由于靈敏激勵和穩(wěn)定性之間的兩難沖突引起的經(jīng)濟危機。在這個模型里有兩種類型的動態(tài)方程，一類是有關(guān)專家人數(shù)的動態(tài)方程，另一類是有關(guān)相對價格的動態(tài)方程。這個模型能用來解釋由于教育和工作之間的時滯而引起的職業(yè)需求的波動，也能夠用來解釋由于增加靈敏系數(shù)的_化改革或由于資本、物品和勞動流動而導(dǎo)致貿(mào)易效率的增加而引起的經(jīng)濟危機。(JEL: D58, E32)

關(guān)鍵詞: 蛛網(wǎng)模型，分工的協(xié)調(diào)失敗，靈敏激勵

The dynamics and stability of a network
with division of labour

1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to use a cobweb model to investigate coordination failure of division of labour and economic crisis caused by the trade off between sensitive incentives and stability. At the end of the 20th century, the theory of rati
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nt prior to privatization reforms. This significantly increased the sensitivity of the feedback mechanism. Privatization reforms further increased the sensitivity, which is good for providing incentives, but not good for stability. Of course, corruption and money laundering were the source of negative signals. Without the moral hazard caused by opportunism, sensitive feedback itself may not be problematic, just like what happened to the highly developed financial market in Taiwan and in Western Europe. But moral hazard itself is not enough to e*plain Russia’s and South Koreas financial crises, since moral hazard in China, which was not greatly affected by the Asian financial crisis, is even greater than in Russia and South Korea. Some economists e*plain the financial crises in Russian and Asia using the conventional models of moral hazard (see references in Chio,2000; Dennis& Kandel, 2000; Chowdhry & Goyal, 2000; Garten, 1999; Corsetti, Pensenti, & Roubini, 1999; Mishkin, 1991). But these models cannot e*plain why the crises occurred when liberalization and privatization were implemented. Lios (1998) model and the model of Aghion et al (1999) show that the trade-offs between reliability, transaction costs, and economies of division of labour and between incentive provision, sharing risk, and stability can e*plain the crises better. Our paper will have features of both Lio’s model with the trade-off between economies of division of labour and coordination reliability of the network division of labour and Aghion et al’s model with a cobweb feedback mechanism. This will allow us to e*plore the implications for the network effects of division of labour on aggregate productivity of the trade-off between sensitive incentive provision and stability of the price feedback mechanism.
This paper is organized as following: Section 2 is devoted to describe a static general equilibrium model of endogenous network size of division of labour, which provides a basis for the dynamic analysis in Section 3. In Section 3, we give the simulation results of cobweb model. The final section concludes the paper.

2. A Static General Equilibrium Model of Endogenous Network Size of Division of Labour
Consider an economy with a continuum set of identical consumer-producers of mass M.[ As shown by Sun, Yang, and Zhou (2004), general equilibria may not e*ist if the set of individuals is finite in the kind of models of endogenous network size of division of labour in this paper. They have proved the e*istence theorem and the first welfare theorem for a general class of equilibrium models with endogenous network pattern of division of labour, of which the static model in this paper is a special case.
] Each consumer-producer’s utility function is
(2.1) .
where *i is the self-provided amount of good i, *id is the amount of good i purchased and k is the fraction of a unit of good purchased that is received for final consumption. Each consumer-producer has the following production functions, endowment constraint for working time and budget constraint.
(2.2) ,, , i=1,2,3.
(2.3)
where *is is the amount of good i that is sold and *i + *is is the output level of good i. is a fi*ed learning and training cost in producing each good. This system of production displays economies of specialization for each individual in producing each good. li is an individual’s labour allocation to the production of good i, called level of specialization in producing good i. Subscript i stands for good i, superscript s stands for the quantity sold (supplied), and superscript d stands for the quantity purchased (demanded), is the price of good i.
According to the theorem of optimum configuration (Wen, 1998, Yao, 2002), there are three types of configurations: Autarky (denoted as A), as shown in Fig. 2.1(a), selling good i and buying good j, denoted (i/j), and selling good i and buying goods j and t, denoted (i/jt), There are si* of the second type of configurations: (1/2), (2/1), (1/3), (3/1), (2/3), and (3/2). Configurations (1/3) and (3/1) are shown in Fig. 2.1(b). There are three of the third type of configrations: (1/23), (2/13), and (3/12), as shown in Fig. 2.1(c).
(a) Autarky (b) Structure P (c) Structure D
no market Partial division of labor Complete division of labor

Figure 2.1: Evolution of Division of Labor
Combinations of these configurations yield three types of structures. M individuals choosing configuration A constitute an autarky structure. A division of M individuals between conf ……（未完，全文共33610字，當(dāng)前僅顯示6045字，請閱讀下面提示信息。收藏《論文：分工網(wǎng)絡(luò)的動態(tài)學(xué)和穩(wěn)定性》）